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Alternatives and Animal Rights:
A Reply to Maurice Visscher
Andrew N. Rowan, Editor-in-Chief
Many scientists are uneasy about the idea of alternatives to the use of labor
atory animals. One reason for their tentativeness could be the vigorous promo
tion of the alternatives concept by traditional enemies of the biomedical research
establishment. As a result, innuendo, misinformation and emotion cloud a ration
al discussion of the topic. Too many simplistic claims have been made by oppo
nents of biomedical research, but defenders of the present level of animal experi
mentation are also guilty of overgeneralization and faulty reasoning.
A classic example of such flawed argument, albeit superficially convincing,
which is propounded by extreme elements in the research community, can be
found in the recent article by Professor Maurice Visscher entitled "Animal Rights
and Alternative Methods" (The Pharos [Fall] 11-19, 1979).
The author's first attack is aimed at a statement, attributed to animal libera
tion philosopher Peter Singer, that it would be no more immoral to perform pain
ful and even lethal experiments on mentally defective human beings than on
other animals. This misrepresents Singer's central argument that the criterion of
rationality is an insufficient reason for regarding human beings as objects of
greater moral concern than animals. Singer reasons that if rationality were to be
our criterion for moral concern, then some animals would be included in that
universe, or some mentally defective human beings would be excluded. He illus
trates the consequences of such logic by arguing that, if we permit experiments
on chimpanzees, then we should not object to similar experiments on certain
severely mentally deficient human beings. However, Singer argues that rather
than diminish the number of living creatures worthy of moral concern, we should
expand that number to include many nonhuman species as well.
Visscher also takes exception to Singer's advice to students to refuse partici
pation in animal experiments required for their courses and to demonstrate
against those university departments which abuse animals. No doubt such activ
ity would be uncomfortable for both the students and the academic staff, but the
freedom to demonstrate in favor of certain moral values is one which Western
society takes pains to defend. The forms of protest advocated by Singer are,
therefore, legitimate.
Visscher objects to attempts to legislate what he terms "kindness" and
argues that "our society" punishes criminal acts but does not "harass law-abiding
citizens to prevent them from committing crimes." This is incorrect. Much of the
American civil rights legislation attempts to legislate for "desirable" behavior
patterns and, therefore, legislating for ethical values is not without precedent.
In October, 1977, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) issued a report
(FAS Public Interest Report 30(8):8, 1977) which was critical of the reactionary atti
tude of spokesmen for biomedical scientists toward animal welfare questions.
The report suggested that a scientific association dedicated to the promotion of
animal welfare be formed and, in due course, this suggestion came to fruition
with the establishment of the Scientists' Center for Animal Welfare (SCAW).
Visscher reacts strongly against the tone of the FAS report and the foundation of
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SCAW and alludes darkly to the fact that several of the SCAW founders are
British-trained. It is not particularly clear why several of the more prominent sci
entific representatives on an'imal welfare issues should either be English or trained
in England, but whatever the reason, it provides no sound grounds for insinuating
that their arguments are invalid.
Visscher also takes issue with the FAS report's statement that "it is no longer
possible to ignore the fact that animals have mental processes" and argues that,
to his knowledge, no biologists have claimed that "lower animals do not have
mental processes in varying degrees of development." This may be so, but biolo
gists have certainly argued that the rudimentary nature of such processes is an
important feature in making moral judgments concerning the use of animals in
experiments. In an earlier paper, Visscher himself argues that, "the basic justifica
tion...for acceptance of the ethic that says it is proper for man to use other
animals in decent ways to serve his own purposes, lies in the large gap that exists
between man and other beasts with respect to mental capacities." (M. Visscher,
Proc Am Phil Soc 776:157-162, 1972). As argued in the FAS report, recent research
on primate (particularly ape) communication has indicated that the gap is by no
means as large as was previously believed. Interestingly, Visscher's argument
could conceivably lead to the conclusion that it would be moral to use certain
mentally subnormal human beings in "decent" experiments to serve the purpose
of those who have vastly greater (i.e., normal) mental capacities.
In general, Visscher's arguments are based on the age-old tactic of misrepre
senting or simplifying the arguments of others in order to destroy their credibility.
Recent animal rights arguments are categorized as "superficially more sophisti
cated" but "simplistic and unrealistically absolutist as, for example, in the naive
assertion that ends can never justify means." The more sophisticated animal
rights philosophies do accept that the rights of human beings can sometimes
supersede the rights of other animals. Furthermore, several academic philoso
phers now exploring these questions are attempting to establish ethical guide
lines to help researchers decide when the rights of animals can be overridden for
the benefit of humanity. Similar problems have arisen in human experimentation.
The general consensus now appears to be that such research can be justified, but
only when the hazards to the individual are properly explained and where the
risks to the individual do not outweigh the possible benefits.
Visscher's views are no longer (if they ever were) representative of biomedi
cal scientists, and his arguments against scientists establishing dialogue with so
called "emotional advocates" are now beginning to rebound as the subjective
basis of and errors in his own statements are pointed out. (For example, a British
Prime Minister and the Council of Europe have not called for "absolute bans on
certain types of toxicity testing" as claimed in the Pharos article.) Support for the
animal liberation movement is, in part, a consequence of the unwillingness of
biomedical organizations to accept that there are any abuses of animals in the
laboratory and to discuss them in a constructive fashion with animal welfare or
ganizations. There has been a softening of attitude and more dialogue is taking
place, but there is still much room for improvement (see Comment by J.R. Lindsey).
Tension between those who conduct animal experiments and those who op
pose them will always exist, but there are widespread pressures at the present to
redraw the lines governing what is and is not acceptable in animal research. In
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contrast to Dr. Visscher, I do not believe that the "future of experimental medi
cine is in jeopardy" as a result of promotion of the "alternatives" concept. Quite
the contrary, full acceptance of "alternatives" could lead to valuable and excit
ing new perspectives for old problems.

Advocacy, Objectivity and the Draize Test
Peter Singer, Editorial Advisory Board
As Michael Fox and Andrew Rowan made clear in the first issue of this jour
nal, a workable blend of scientific objectivity and humane advocacy must be
achieved if the journal is to realize its objectives. The current campaign against
the Draize eye test challenges scientists to combine objectivity and advocacy,
and provides an opportunity of demonstrating how these often contrasted
stances can be united.
Now that more than three hundred organizations have joined the coalition
against the Draize test led by New York activist Henry Spira, and full-page adver
tisements have appeared in the New York Times and other major newspapers,
most readers of this journal must be aware of the campaign; but for those that are
not, the story can be briefly told. The Draize eye test is the routine use of the eyes
of conscious, unanesthetized rabbits to test every substance which may be hazar
dous to human eyes. The chemical is poured in one eye of each rabbit by pulling
the lower lid away from the eyeball to form a cup. The eyes are examined for in
jury at 1, 24, 48 and 72 hours, and sometimes also after one, two and three weeks.
The official U.S. government guide describes some of the reactions as "ulcera
tion of the cornea; opacity of the cornea; inflammation of the iris; hemorrhage;
gross destruction." The object of the campaign against this test is to persuade the
cosmetics industry to put up one hundredth of one percent of its gross income for
a cash program to develop an alternative to the Draize test. (For Revlon, one of
the industry leaders, this would mean a tax deductible contribution of $150,000.)
That there is cause here for advocacy on behalf of animals, anyone whose
ethical principles extend to nonhuman animals will see at once, but that scien
tific objectivity can in this context be combined with advocacy may take a mo
ment longer to appreciate.
Scientific objectivity comes into this campaign with respect to three differ
ent questions: Is the test painful? Is the test reliable? Is the test unavoidable?
Some scientists will balk at the idea that the painfulness of a test is a matter
for scientific observation. Admittedly, we cannot measure the subjective feeling
of pain in rabbits -or in humans, for that matter. But that is no reason to take
refuge in behavioristic evasions like describing the rabbits' reactions to having
chemicals placed in their eyes as 'aversive behavior.' That animals like rabbits
feel pain in these circumstances is not only common sense, it is also the simplest
hypothesis which explains the behavior we observe; behavior which includes, as
the official Draize test guide notes, squealing, jumping and attempts to escape.
The test is painful. Is it reliable? Carrol S. Weil and Robert A. Scala, writing in
Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology (19:276-360, 1971) found considerable var212
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iation in the results reported from different laboratories testing the same sub
stance. In a 1974 court case, the Food and Drug Administration was unable to
show that the Draize test was appropriate for evaluating safety, or that the
results of tests on the eyes of rabbits can be extrapolated to humans (USA vs.
Beacon Castille Shampoo No 71-53, Northern District Court, Ohio). In this situa
tion it is the role of scientists to read the relevant reports and evidence, which are
not readily accessible to the general public, and to explain their significance.
Finally, is the test unavoidable? The late Dr. D.H. Smyth, a recent chairman
of the British Research Defence Society, and therefore anything but an anti-vivi
sectionist, wrote in his book Alternatives to Animal Experiments (Scolar Press,
London, UK, 1978) that it should not be difficult to find nonanimal alternatives
to the Draize test since this is a "relatively circumscribed problem." Eighteen
months ago Henry Spira presented Revlon with a scientific paper by Dr. Leonard
Rack on possible leads toward an alternative to the Draize test; more recently
Andrew Rowan has outlined further possibilities. Here again is an area in which a
scientist, making an objective assessment, seems likely to reach conclusions
which will contribute toward the elimination of a major form of animal abuse.
Some scientists may believe that standing up and publicly stating their views
on these issues could, in the context of the current campaign, damage their
reputation for objectivity among their colleagues and with the public at large.
They should reconsider. There is nothing in the notion of scientific objectivity
which demands silence when speaking the truth will aid ruthlessly exploited
creatures who cannot speak for themselves.
Draize Test Campaign Update: As of 22 May 1980, the following develop
ments on the Draize eye test had occurred -either as a result of the current cam
paign or on the initiative of the companies and agencies concerned.

• The Consumer Product Safety Commission, which is responsible for en
forcing the regulations of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (includ
ing a Draize eye irritancy test requirement) has declared a 90-day mora
torium on all of its eye irritancy testing while investigations are con
ducted into the possibility of using local anesthetics to reduce the ani
mals' suffering.
• The lnteragency Research Liaison Croup has produced a final docu
ment setting out guidelines for acute toxicity testing which include a
revised eye irritancy procedure. The test is based on the Draize
method, but local anesthetics are permitted if they do not interfere
with the evaluation of irritancy.
• On April 25, Avon produced an update on animal testing which includ
ed the following points: Avon has not used stocks to hold the rabbits
since 1965. Since March of 1980, new guidelines have been in force in
Avon's laboratories which require greater use of local anesthetics and
the dilution of test substances. Avon is also studying ways to reduce
the overall number of Draize eye irritation tests.
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